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MILITANTS AND THE MEDIA: PARTNERS IN
TERRORISM?
WILLIAM R. CATTON, JR.*

In March, 1977 in the Canary Islands, a KLM 747 and a Pan American
747 landed at Tenerife. They had been diverted from another airport where
terrorist happened then to be interfering with flight operations. As the two
jumbo jets prepared to resume their transoceanic flights, they collided on the
foggy runway. Five hundred and eighty-one innocent traverlers met death in
the firey mishap.
That record toll for a commercial aviation disaster could have come four
years earlier. In 1973 a comparable number of airline passengers might have
been blasted out of the Italian sky to publicize grievances not necessarily
shared by any of them but passionately felt by one of the groups of frustrated
people so ubiquitous in the modem world. It did not happen, though,
because portable heat-seeking anti-aircraft rockets in possession of Palestinian
terrorists were confiscated by authorities at the Rome airport in time to prevent such an incident.' Somewhere else, some other time, it may yet occur.
Modem terrorism is both shaped and invited by modem circumstances.
Airline hijacking, for example, a frequent technique of international terrorism, was obviously unavailable as a tactic of militancy until commercial
aviation came into being. Once airplanes had been invented, it was natural
that they should undergo steady improvement on several dimensions, with
their range, speed, and size of payload all being impressively increased. The
engineers who accomplished these improvements could not be expected to
foresee what opportunities and inducements they were providing to sufficiently desperate individuals and groups who might be tempted to practice a new
form of piracy. Hijacking did not become common until airliners became
huge, swift, and long-range. Only recently has it become possible for a commandeered airplane to be diverted to virtually any destination the terrorist
might choose. Not until the jet age could be expected to reach even a remote
part of the world within few enough hours for the hijacker's desperation to
remain focused on political or quasi-political goals and not give way to preoccupation with his own bodily needs for sustenance or sleep. Not until aircraft
grew large enough to carry passengers by the hundreds rather than by the
dozen, in a world where life for some had lost its luster, was there substantial
probability that someone on board would harbor some motive stronger than
his own instinct of self-preservation. And then, of course, the impressive
number of hostages he could hold in jeopardy by threatening destruction of
*Professor of Sociology, Washington State University.

INDIANA LAWJOURNAL

[Vol. 53:703

the one aircraft provided substantial leverage for an act of political
blackmail.
Technological developments have made potentially available for terrorist
use an unprecedented arsenal of destructive devices and tactics. Not only are
there such insidious weapons as letter bombs, but there hovers over the lawabiding world now the prospect of really massive blackmail if a terrorist
group were to obtain possession of a nuclear weapon, or materials for
biological warfare. Moreover, modem media of communication enable the
terrorist to command the attention of far-flung millions, and perhaps to work
his nefarious will upon whole nations instead of just the hostages in his immediate presence whom he threatens directly with physical violence.
Modem media of communication are thus subject to use in ways never
contemplated by (and perhaps inconceivable to) the authors of the first
amendment. New circumstances thus raise unavoidable questions. Is it possible, for example, to prevent unscrupulous perpetrators of violence from taking illicit advantage of the existence and nature of the mass media of communication? It it is possible to deny such groups access to the media, can this
be done within the spirit of the first amendment? The latter question is for
legal minds to consider; the former question is essentially technical, to be
answered in the best available light of social science knowledge. First it is
necessary to consider some things that are known about human beings in
general, about social movements and terrorists in particular. Next the trends
in terrorism will be discussed. Finally the media's role in light of these factors
will be examined.
HUMAN NATURE,

SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND TEMPTATIONS TO TERRORISM

Terrorism has raised serious legal and ethical issues, and questions of
policy. Resolution of these issues, and answers to these questions of policy
may depend on what factors are assumed to constitute an explanation for the
terrorist episodes that get our attention. An article in Reader's Digest by
two members of its editorial staff provides an example of this connection between assumptions and answers. 2 It purports to discern three terrorist types:
(1) "rootless rebels" who "invariably" believe devoutly in "a fairy-tale
ideological world of good guys versus bad guys;" (2) rootless members of
ethnic minorities "goaded by an outraged sense of injustice;" and (3) common
criminals. The article ends by recommending congressional authorization of
'Anable, Coming to Grips with World Terrorism, Christian Sci. Monitor, Dec. 19, 1975,
at 14-15.
2Strother & Methvin, Terrorism on the Rampage, READERS DIG. [hereinafter cited as
Strother & Methvin]. For more sophisticated analyses of terrorism, see C. BAUMANN. THE
DIPLOMATIC KIDNAPPINGS (1973); D.

CARLTON & C. SCHAERF. INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AND

WORLD SECURITY (1975); B. JENKINS, INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM (1975); W. LAQUEUR. TER.
RORISM (1977). For a medical view of the topic, see F. HACKER, CRUSADERS, CRIMINALS, CRAZIES
(1976).
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FBI wiretapping for anti-terrorist "intelligence collection," and quotes
Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn as an advocate of firmness in suppressing hijacking
and other forms of terrorism. According to the Digest authors,
Ultimately . . . the only truly effective counter-weapon is intelligence. That
means-in the United States-giving the FBI the legal and scientific tools it
needs, plus public understanding and support for their aggressive use. It
means spies, networks of paid informers, wiretaps, bugs, computerized dossier
systems-the whole spectrum of clandestine warfare so necessary
to the cause,
3
yet so vulnerable to attack by civil-libertarian extremists.
To put terrorism in better perspective, some basic insights into the nature
of social movements are essential. Social movements, even those that employ
terrorist tactics, are products of the social nature of Homo sapiens. To
understand terrorism, then, requires basic knowledge of the sources and
characteristics of human sociality.
Human beings have to be social to survive. As a species, we are helpless
in infancy and we appear to have few inborn patterns of behavior that could
enable us to cope as lone adults. So we develop the very traits that make us
human as a result of the myriad interactions we have with others, especially
as we are growing up. Above all we become communicators; we learn
language. Communication looms larger in human life than in the life of any
other species, even the most social of the insects, birds, or pre-human mammals.
In these basic respects, terrorists are human ("inhuman" as their actions
may seem to those of us who live within the law). Some terrorist acts perhaps
need, therefore, to be viewed as (lamentable, desperate, incoherent) attempts
to communicate. To some extent terrorists are people for whom more conventional means of communication seem unavailable or ineffective. In some instances, at least, the conventional means seem unavailable because they are
unavailable. Sometimes, however, appearances are deceptive.
Having acquired human traits and skills from participation in groups,
continued group involvement becomes for all of us a major drive. Some sort
of loyalty to the group(s) we identify with is also a normal human response to
the group incubation of human personality. More or less unquestioning
preference for in-group thoughtways and behavior patterns, and aversion to
out-group thoughtways and behavior patterns (when they differ from familiar
ways), are also normal. Genetically, we humans are so constituted that we are
destined to spend our lives absorbing from our associates a non-genetic
heritage (i.e., culture). As that kind of creature, we are naturally and almost
inescapably ethnocentric. Some instances of terrorist ideology and behavior
may need to be understood as (perverse) manifestations of such humanly normal group loyalty and ethnocentrism.
3

Strother & Methvin, supra note 2, at 77.
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For most of us, these drives (to communicate, to identify with our group,
to reject alien ways) arise and express themselves first in the context of that
kind of group we call a family; but as we mature, we acquire interests that
can be implemented by other sorts of groups. Our ethnocentrism may become
somewhat tempered with fascination for the exotic. One result of human
maturation is the formation of voluntary associations, or clusters of people
who share interests somewhat more segmentally than the way interests remain
4
all-encompassingly mutual in the intimacy of a family.
Now a distinction needs to be made between two broad categories of activity. Some voluntary associations engage in activity that is mainly consummatory-concerned with members' interest in self-gratification. The behavior
is indulged in for its own sake, rather than as a means to some more ultimate
goal. (A hiking club or a camera club would be an obvious example of a
voluntary association that was mainly consummatory.) In other associations,
the principal activities are more instrumental; the behavior of the members is
addressed to the pursuit of some purpose other than direct personal pleasure.
Gratification may be a by-product of such activity but it is not the aim. Professional associations, such as the American Bar Association (ABA) or the
American Association of University Professors (AAUP), tend to be of this instrumental type.
For some members even in groups like the ABA or the AAUP, organizational activity as such may be especially gratifying. The line between instrumental and consummatory activity can thus become blurred. Recognition
of this fact can help us to understand variations in motivation toward terrorism. For some individuals in some circumstances, participation may
become a goal in itself.
Sometimes an association that originated from consummatory interests
takes on a more instrumental cast (as when a fraternal organization provides
insurance and other services for its members, or when it becomes a pressure
group seeking to influence public policies). It is important to recognize,
however, that the drift can be in the other direction, from instrumental to
consummatory. This, too, must be borne in mind if we are to avoid
misleading inferences about what makes terrorists tick. Their violence may
not always be as goal-directed as it purports to be.
A social movement, then, is a voluntary association whose goal is to bring
about change in a larger society. 5 Perhaps it only seeks to change public opinion, or it may actually strive to change behavior, or to restructure social
relationships. Insofar as the group's actions are calculated to serve these ends,
the movement is instrumentally oriented, but actions of an organization that
are ostensibly instrumental may in fact sometimes be more nearly consum4

M. HAUSKNECHT. THE JOINERS (1962).

5

R.

ASH. SOCIAL MOVEMENTS IN AMERICA (1972); J. MCCARTHY & M. ZALD. THE TREND OF

SOCIAL MOVEMENTS IN AMERICA (1973).
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matory. For example, when some group trying to promote a lost cause vainly
continues its activities, the interest it really serves is its members' need for
reassurance of their own enduring virtue and significance. Their ostensibly instrumental behavior is actually "expressive." It expresses their earnest desire
for self-respect. In many instances such a desire probably underlies acts or
threats of violence by terrorist movements.
James Q. Wilson has suggested that for many of the black people involved in the race riots of the 1960's those riots were expressive acts, satisfying to
the extent that they gave expression to a state of mind. 6 He further suggests
that whereas the previous generation "was absorbed by Camus's intricate
analysis of how in existential terms one might have justified the effort to
assassinate the czar," some young people have more recently been impressed
with the argument by Frantz Fanon that violence practiced by the wretched
and oppressed may be intrinsically valuable as an assertion of self. What
Wilson says of racial violence probably applies more generally to contemporary terrorism. Much of it is rewarding to the militants who engage in it
because it serves as an assertion of self in an age that oppresses even middle
class youth with what we might term "significance deprivation." In a city of
several million inhabitants almost anyone can wonder at times, "Do I, as one
individual, really matter?"
Writing about the sometimes violent activism of university students who
were so largely of white middle class origin, John W. Aldridge has emphasized the expressive element:
They were born twenty years too late to have a part in that knightly crusade
against tyranny which World War II now seems sentimentally to symbolize
for their fathers ...
The virtue of activism is that it provides a fair substitute for this lost opportunity. It . . . makes it.possible for the young . . . to fight their own
morally acceptable war, carry on their own knightly crusade against tyranny,
in brick-throwing street battles with the police and in stalwart confrontations
of nerve
with authorities old enough to be as enviably favored by history as
7
Dad.

Perhaps not all, but some, terrorist activity arises from expressive interests of
the same sort as these.
TRENDS IN TERRORISM: IS IT ON THE RISE?

In addition to general social stimuli it is also useful to consider the question, "Why now?" What is it about the state of our world today that enables
5Wilson, Why We Are Hating a Wave of Violence, N.Y. Times, May, 19, 1968 (Magazine),
at 116. 7
Aldridge, In the Country of the Young, Part II, HARIP'r'S MAGAZINE, Nov. 1969, at
93-94.
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(and provokes) human beings to terrorize other human beings? Answers to
that question must involve consideration of both the changing opportunities
for, and changing compulsions toward, terrorist activities. Unless the changing structure of opportunities and compulsions is taken into account, common sense assumptions about the causes and motivations of terrorism are likely to give rise to quite ineffective remedies. Opponents of terrorism may embrace their own fairy tale, one that prescribes no better strategy than
clandestine warfare by the good guys (i.e., the spies, paid informers, wiretappers) and, when the occasion arises, as at Entebbe or Mogadishu, overt
combat by commando squads.
Clearly, in view of the middle class origins of many militants, terrorism
does not arise merely in response to economic hardship or political repression
personally experienced by the individuals who participate in these
movements. Especially insofar as terrorism may be expressive, it arises from
subtler forms of deprivation- deprivation associated with being born too late
in the world's history.
Much of the culture that most of us have internalized was formed in a
world very different from the world of today. The change in circumstances
between then and now bears heavily upon the social movements of our time.
A darkening future may make many movements less instrumental and more
expressive then their members suppose. This may be a crucial consideration
for understanding the roots of at least some of the publicity-seeking terrorist
episodes that pose difficult moral and legal dilemmas.
For Americans especially, but also for people elsewhere in the world,
there had grown up in the last two or three centuries a faith in progress and
an expectation that whatever might be the shortcomings of the present, they
could be rectified in the future. Today that faith seems to have waned. 8 Its
waning was foreshadowed as early as 1890 by the Census Bureau
superintendent's announcement that America no longer had a frontier of settlement. The delayed but cumulative effects of that change were global
rather than merely national. 9 The expectation that the future would be better
than the present or past was nurtured by the existence for about four centuries of a New World. Opportunistic expansion of people from the Old
World into an unexpectedly enlarged habitat helped democratize their
political, economic, and religious institutions, and wrought equally significant
changes in family mores. But eventually this expansion had to result in invalidation of the sense of limitlessness that had come to be the central
premise of people's lives. The once-New World became more filled up with
people than Europe had been when Columbus set sail. The future, therefore,
8
This loss of faith was noted in the first State of the Union address of the Nixon administration, as discussed by Stewart Alsop in The Mysterious American Disease, NEWsWEEK,
Feb. 9, 1970, at 98. It was exemplified even more compellingly in R. HEILBRONER. AN INQUIRY

INTO THE HUMAN PROSPEcT (1974).
'W. WEBB. THE GREAT FRONTIER (1952).
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is not what it used to be. 10 This is a fact of life that must be recognized if we
are to understand the desperation of some of our contemporaries. Giving the
FBI or any other agency "the legal and scientific tools" for waging
"clandestine warfare" against terrorists will hardly alleviate the oppressive
sense of lost limitlessness, or prevent recent changes from nurturing
predispositions toward expressive violence. Wiretapping is unlikely to make
the planet seem less crowded or the future less constrictive.
Potent twentieth century technology has magnified the power of each of
us to get in the way of others (and inadvertently interfere with each other's
pursuit of happiness). We are now much more geographically mobile than
people were when the virgin hemisphere seemed so endless, and our per
capita resource appetites have been enormously enlarged. So we are vastly
more competitive in our quest for shares of the world's finite resources, such
as oil from the Middle East. Our competitiveness is channeled by such factors
as the division of human societies into contrasting categories- "developed"
versus "underdeveloped" countries. But to label the nations of the Third
World "underdeveloped" is to go beyond simply denoting their comparative
poverty; it is to recognize the aspiration of their peoples to become
"developed," and to presuppose that their destiny does include acquisition
eventually of resource appetites as prodigal as those now characteristic of
either the capitalist or socialist industrialized worlds.
In an ineluctably finite global habitat, however, where resources will not
suffice to assuage universalized and perpetually escalating desires, a revolution of rising expectations must be expected to have nurtured a revolution of
rising despair. If there has been a growing sense of "oppression" it has
ecological roots-less visible, perhaps, but more inexorable than the
ideologically touted tyrannies of ruling classes or regimenting activities of
overzealous bureaucracies. As people have reluctantly begun to sense that the
impossible dream of universal modernization probably is impossible, this may
have helped foster an epidemic tendency to resort to revolutionary violence as
a means of denying unwelcome truth.
Suppose the impediments to fulfilling our dreams were merely political.
As Charles Reich noted: "To young people, one of the most frustrating things
about the system is that it does not even have to respond-and usually it gives
no sign that it has even heard. Young people want to kick it-to at least force
it to bestir itself."'" Ecosystems can be at least as nonresponsive to unrealistic
human aspirations as political systems may have been. At any rate, terrorists
seem to agree with Reich that "[a]nger is better than complacent indif2
ference."'
"cCatton, Why the Future Isn't What It Used to Be (And How It Could Be Made Worse
than It Has to Be), 57 Soc. ScI. Q. 276 (1976).
"1C. REICH, THE GREENING oF AMERICA 237 (1970) [hereinafter cited as REICH].
12Id.

INDIANA LAWJOURNAL

[Vol. 53:703

In the long run, however, if limits to growth are as binding as informed
investigators now take them to be, anger may turn out to be "better" only in
an expressive sense, not in any instrumental way. Customers too far back in
the queue to withdraw funds from a failing bank before it goes broke cannot,
by their anger, convert bankruptcy back into solvency. For some, though, the
very futility of angry reactions to such circumstances may intensify the sense
of outrage. The tendency today for militant movements to present their
demands as non-negotiable may arise partly from fear that postponing attainment of goals means never attaining them. When time is felt to be running
out, the virtues of tolerance and compassion can easily degenerate, and compromise is seen as permanently wasted opportunity.
Episodes of violence (and threats of violence) that now and then make
headlines are manifestations of an unrest that has become worldwide. Often
the violent acts seem to be committed for the purpose of generating
headlines. The immediate victims of those acts are often not the objects of
the terrorists' antagonism. They are pawns, used merely as a means of
checkmating more powerful entities elsewhere. Some of the groups so
desperate for publicity want it as a presumed means of attaining political,
economic, or nationalistic goals, but some appear to crave publicity for its
own sake-i.e., as an antidote to the ignominy of seeming superfluous in a
world too vast to have otherwise noticed their existence.
Whichever may be the incentive in a particular case, one social movement after another-one day in the Middle East, or Africa, another time in
Europe or Asia, or next day somewhere in North or South America-does in
fact call attention to itself by some dramatic act. The specific event (or
threat) is but a paragraph in the script of modern history.
Have these theatrical episodes waxed more violent in recent years? Have
they become more frequent? Or are they merely the current manifestations of
an old, old story? Has terrorist activity "always" been more prevalent than
nice people wanted to acknowledge?
It may not be possible to answer these questions. As violence drew increasing attention in the 1960's, it became fashionable in some circles to insist
that this was not new. Past American brutality toward slaves, Indians, and
aliens was cited to support assertions that violence had long been "as
American as apple pie."' 3 Reckless use of certain key words, however,
obstructs careful analysis of serious matters. For example, the author of one
best-seller went so far as to assert that American schools controlled development of young people through a "total atmosphere of violence."14 But he
went on to reveal the flagrant semantic inflation implicit in his excessive use
of that word; he defined violence as "any assault upon, or violation of, the
personality"' 5 (not necessarily or even usually physical). "An examination or
11H. GRAHAM & T.
14REICH,

IsId.

GURR, THE HISTORY OF VIOLENCE IN AMERICA

supra note 11, at 100.

(1969).
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test is a form of violence,' 6 he said. "Compulsory gym, to one embarrassed
or afraid, is a form of violence. The requirement that a student must get a
pass to walk in the hallways is violence. Compelled attendance in the
'7
classroom, compulsory studying in study hall, is violence.'
While terrorists have typically used (or threatened to use) physical
violence, so that there is little doubt that their violence is real, issues of its
changing abundance are beclouded by tendencies to label as "terrorists" only
those users of violence whose goals or affiliations we disapprove. Approved
users of violence are labeled "patriots," "freedom fighters," etc. Moreover,
statistical data purporting to show historic trends toward increased or
decreased incidence of terrorism may be discounted by arguments over
changing definitions of socially acceptable or unacceptable forms of coercion.
Inferences that violence has risen or declined may also be vitiated by recognition that methods of collecting information have changed. Record keeping efficiency has also changed.
The pertinent issue, however, is not whether terrorism is more abundant
or more vicious today than at some time in the past. The real question is
whether terrorism is more abundant as a result of identifiable pressures than
it would be now if those pressures were not operating. A major aim of this
paper is to point out some of those pressures.
Because of the ecological interdependence of our world and the numbers
of human beings trying to live on it, progress by one movement toward attainment of its avowed goals constitutes resented interference with pursuit of
conflicting goals by some other group. Movements therefore induce countermovements. Faced with opposition, passion on behalf of an ideology
sometimes expresses itself in extremely unconventional ways. Antagonism
escalates into open conflict. Once-peaceful tactics give way to violence. But
much of the violence is committed by groups too small or not powerful
enough to win their ends by direct application of force. Instead they often
hope for an amplification process whereby their comparatively puny efforts
will influence the flow of larger forces.
We now live in a time when the news media regularly report that some
organization "has claimed responsibility for" someone's murder, for a kidnapping, or for a bomb blast in a consulate or in the offices of an international
corporation. It used to be that the perpetrators of illegal acts tried to conceal
their identity and avoid being tagged with responsibility for their transgressions. Under present circumstances, however, groups "claim responsibility" for
heinous acts because only thus can they reap publicity value from such
events.
The Reader's Digest article previously cited spoke of "Today's epidemic of
savagery."' 8 An editorial in the Jesuit magazine America alluded to the "rash
eid.
27Id.

"Strother & Methvin, supra note 2.
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of episodes of international terrorism." 1 9 But in September, 1975, a Special
Assistant to the Secretary of State (and former head of the international relations faculty at the National War College) reported that worldwide there had
been some eight hundred persons killed by acts of international terrorism
since 1968.20 Have those eight hundred deaths produced, or merely reflected,
a climate of fear? In one sense, eight hundred is hardly a very large number.
More than twice that many people die in a single year in the United States
from asthma, and few of us live in dread of that malady or regard it as
"epidemic." The annual death toll from influenza in the United States is
almost ten times the seven or eight year global toll from terrorism, yet people
tend to think of flu as more of a nuisance than a dire peril.
Minor though it may be statistically, terrorism has coerced governments
and giant business firms. It has complicated the boarding procedures at airports in all parts of the world. It has harrassed diplomatic staffs. It has
impeded the administration of justice. It has diverted public attention from
less dramatic but more fundamental dangers facing our civilization. Thus
there has indeed occurred an amplification effect, as sought by the terrorists.
SYMBIOSIS AND REINFORCEMENT

Human societies have become much more interdependent, partly as a
result of the technological progress that has enabled us to use commodities
obtained from all corners of the world,2 1 and partly because modern communications enable us to witness events almost anywhere in the world as they
happen or almost immediately thereafter. But this also means that human
societies have become more vulnerable. 22 There are more opportunities than
ever before for kicking the system and trying to compel it to bestir itself. The
scale on which blackmail can be practiced has been prodigiously enlarged.
Terrorists sometimes take hostages. Hostages can be used quite explicitly
to blackmail the mass media into providing publicity for the movement and
its goals. The price exacted for sparing the hostages' lives, that is, may be
provision of access to television network time for a propaganda speech by the
movement's leader, or provision of front page newspaper space for a
movement-written editorial.
It must be recognized, however, that even without resorting to blackmail,
terrorist movements use the media. Terrorist activity is basically a form of
theater. Terrorists play to an audience. Without the mass media they would
19O'Hare, Of Many Things, 137 AMERIcA (1977) (inside front cover).
2
Terrorism: "Growing and Increasingly Dangerous." U.S. NEWS & WORLD REp., Sept. 29,
1975, at 78 (interview with Robert A. Fearey).
1
" Gibbs & Martin, Urbanization, Technology, and the Division of Labor: InternationalPatterns, 27 AM. Soc. REv. 667 (1962).
"5Hauser, The Chaotic Society: Product of the Social MorphologicalRevolution, 34 M. Soc.
REv. 1 (1969).
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seldom be able to reach audiences as large as those from which they do now
gain attention. The events they perpetrate would be witnessed only by persons
in the immediate locality at the time, and the terrorist group would tend to
be only locally known. Television especially has been crucial to the amplification effect upon which modem terrorism depends for its effectiveness.
On the other hand, television itself is also a form of theater; it also requires an audience. So do the other mass media. The larger its audience the
more each medium thrives. This may be especially so in a country where the
communication industries are commerical enterprises, but it is at least partly
a matter of the very nature of the media. The availability of attention-getting
content (such as acts of terrorism) serves the audience-attracting needs of the
communications industry and has contributed in recent years to the
"success" of the media (in the business sense). In short, there is a kind of
"symbiosis" between terrorists and the media. Each provides something the
other can use. It is as natural for the media to provide terrorist movements
the pubicity they seek (without being blackmailed into doing so) as it is for
the terrorists to provide the media with the audience-exciting content they
seek.
This brings us to the heart of the matter: Does media coverage of terrorist activities foster such behavior? Does reporting what terrorists do increase the incidence of such activity? If news coverage of terrorism publicizes
their demands, does this aid and abet their antisocial efforts? The principal
dimensions of any social science attempt to answer such questions have to do
with (a) the nature of learning processes, and (b) the nature of "success" in
terrorist activity.
Among social scientists, learning processes are today most widely interpreted according to the operant conditioning model. 23 In simplest terms, this
model says that among all the different ways one might behave in given circumstances, any particular way is more likely to be repeated when the circumstances recur if the previous time it was done it was followed by some
gratifying experience. The probability of repeating a given act in particular
crcumstances is reduced if that act's occurrence in those circumstances tends
to be followed by some disliked experience. In short, behavior that is followed
by a "reward" is "reinforced." Behavior that is followed by "punishment" is
"inhibited," and eventually "extinguished."
All this is close to common sense. But note that the "reward" need not be
a result of the behavior to reinforce it; it need only follow it. The association
can be quite coincidental. The gratifying experience need not have been
sought by the learner, nor does it have to have been given deliberately for
any behavior-guiding purpose by.a "teacher." All that is required is that the
associated experience be gratifying and that it be more or less reliably
associated with the behavior, and the behavior will thus be reinforced.
23

Gerwitz, Mechanisms of Social Learning: Some Roles of Stimulation and Behavior in Ear-

ly Human Development, in
Goslin ed. 1969).

HANDBOOK OF SOCIALIZATION THEORY AND RESEARCH

57-212 (D.
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In reality, however, learning is, among humans, a more involved process
than this. For one thing, a person can learn as a result of "vicarious reinforcement" in a process of "observational learning."24 If a person observes
another individual, with whom he more or less identifies, and sees that in certain circumstances a certain action by that other individual tends to be
followed by an experience that is rewarding to that other person, the probability that the observer would behave in those circumstances in about the
way the observed person did is enhanced.
According to the theory of operant conditioning, then, if a terrorist gets
something he wants by committing an act of terrorism, he is more likely to
repeat such an act if the circumstances recur than if he had not been rewarded.
Moreover, according to the principle of observational learning, if a would-be
terrorist observes another person's terrorism "succeeding" (i.e., producing, or
being followed by, results desired by, or apparently gratifying to, the other
person) then the probability is thereby enhanced that the would-be terrorist
will learn to engage in similar overt acts of terrorism when he finds himself in
similar circumstances.
If publicity is what terrorists seek, then the attainment of publicity is
"success" and is rewarding. If the media provide terrorists with publicity, the
media thereby reinforce terrorist activity.
A distinction must, however, be made between publicity about terrorist
activities and publicity about terrorists' goals. And a distinction also needs to
be made between instrumentally oriented terrorists and expressively oriented
terrorists. For instrumentally oriented terrorists, publicity about their goals
(resulting from, or following, their commission of acts of terrorism) would be
reinforcing, but publicity merely about their actions-with no mention of
their goals-would presumably not be reinforcing. On the other hand, for an
expressively oriented terrorist group, any publicity at all that results from or
follows their commission of acts of terrorism would be reinforcing. They seek
publicity "for its own sake," i.e., as a sign of their personal significance.
Media attention to their actions is rewarding insofar as it provides relief from
"significance deprivation" even if the media ignore their ostensible goals.
To such expressively oriented terrorists, moreover, any publicity about
terrorist activities by others, with or without mention of goals, would be
vicariously reinforcing. It should follow, though, that for observer-terrorists
who were instrumentally oriented, publicity about activities by other terrorists
would not be vicariously reinforcing unless the actions were portrayed as
resulting in attainment of goals identical to or closely similar to goals sought
by the observers.
If most terrorists were in fact instrumentally oriented, then studious
avoidance by the media of mentioning goals when terrorist activity is reported
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would suffice to keep the publicity from providing positive reinforcement,
vicarious or otherwise. No other compromise with first amendment liberty of
communication would be needed in that case. Indeed, by making terrorism
appear to be purposeless, such publicity could provide punishment. That is,
it would "give terrorism a bad name" in the eyes of terrorists.
It is highly doubtful, though, that anywhere near all terrorists are strictly
instrumental. As has been suggested earlier in this paper, much of the
motivation for much terrorist activity is probably expressive. Accordingly,
letter-of-the-law reliance on the first amendment as authorization for the
news media to report whatever aspects of terrorist activity they deem newsworthy probably means that the media are (unintentionally) fostering terrorism. Media publicity about any terrorist act provides vicarious reinforcement for expressive terrorist tendencies in persons exposed to that publicity.
There are, of course, offsetting tendencies. Most people are for various
reasons disinclined, and by many social constraints inhibited, from responding in overtly terrorist ways to such observational learning opportunities even
if beset by some of the contemporary kinds of frustration earlier described.
But a few are not so disinclined or so constrained. Even the old "crime does
not pay" formula cannot disengage the media from involvement in the observational learning process, for even the publicized death of a terrorist may be
vicariously rewarding to the seeker of escape from oppressive anonymity.
The legal dilemma is therefore real, but it may be quite generally misconceived. Freedom to report terrorist activities is tantamount to freedom to
reinforce them. But, as media spokesmen will insist, what the first amendment really protects is the public's right to know. Why, then, in practice, are
editors less insistent on our "right to know" in detail all about each asthma
fatality or flu death than about each victim of terrorism? Why have we less
"right to be alerted" by the media to each million tons of potentially climatechanging CO 2 added to the atmosphere, or each ton of radioactive waste added by the electric power industry to the albatross around posterity's neck?
When did the authors of the Bill of Rights decide it was violence committed
by militants that we most needed to be informed about?
Editors may judge the comparative "news value" of such varied events
either wisely or myopically. Issues about the legitimacy of publicizing ominous
happenings turn upon the validity of an unstated assumption: that the first
amendment declared such editorial judgments to be the ultimate criterion for
regulating the flow of information and made media managers (and those with
whom they may develop symbiotic interdependence) the ultimate arbiters of
the public interest.

